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1About the Urban Health Initiative
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) established the Urban Health Initiative (UHI) 
in 1995 to determine whether a concerted, collaborative eﬀort can bring about region-wide 
improvements in multiple measures of child health and safety.  Five cities were chosen to 
implement UHI.  These cities and their respective UHI campaigns are:
• Baltimore’s Safe and Sound Campaign
• Mayor’s Time (Detroit)
• Safe Passages (Oakland)
• Philadelphia Safe and Sound
• Youth Matters (Richmond)
UHI campaigns work to implement proven programmatic strategies at such a large scale that 
citywide statistics will improve signiﬁcantly.  To do that, UHI campaigns must be change 
agents to secure systemic policy and ﬁscal changes necessary to get strategies to that scale.  
The UHI was designed to be non-prescriptive, allowing communities to craft implementation 
plans based on local conditions without assumptions, mandates or imperatives set forward 
by RWJF, which made a ten-year funding commitment.
The National Program Oﬃce (NPO) based in Seattle provides guidance, technical assistance 
and oversight to the local UHI campaigns in a number of areas including research, management, 
systems change and communications.  The NPO also helps campaigns attract and develop 
the local leaders essential to bring about and sustain change in their cities.  Former Seattle 
Mayor Charles Royer is national program director. 
About the UHI’s Lessons Learned Project
The UHI has learned a great deal with regard to developing change agent organizations, and 
securing change in large cities.  The NPO is working to catalogue these lessons so they can 
beneﬁt future change agent organizations and their funders.  As of March 2005, these papers 
had been written (and more are in the works):
• Political Strategizing in a Constantly Changing Environment
• Using Data in the Decision-Making Process
• Sustainable Funding for Program Strategies
• Reﬂections on the Start-Up of the Urban Health Initiative
• The Origins of the Urban Health Initiative
• Communications Planning by Change Agents
• The Experience of an Intermediary in a Complex Systems-Change Initiative:  The Urban 
Health Initiative’s National Program Oﬃce
All papers can be found on the UHI’s website, www.urbanhealth.org. Comments, suggestions 
and questions about the UHI Lessons Learned Project are welcome.  Contact Jerry VanderWood, 
UHI Director of Communications, at 206-616-3692 or jerryvw@u.washington.edu.
2The Experience of an Intermediary  
in a Complex Initiative: 
The Urban Health Initiative’s National Program Ofﬁce
By Prue Brown1
Why an NPO?
When a foundation decides to mount a multi-year, multi-site initiative, among the many 
questions it must address is how to manage it. Who will be responsible for developing the 
ideas behind the initiative, selecting sites, monitoring performance, providing technical 
assistance, promoting cross-site learning, evaluating outcomes, and institutionalizing the 
initiative’s accomplishments? Foundation staﬀ members can take on all these tasks themselves. 
Or they can carry out some of the tasks and hire consultants and support organizations 
to do others.  A third possibility is transferring initiative management to an intermediary 
organization. Some foundations develop their own hybrid models through which they retain 
responsibility for certain tasks and outsource others. 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s (RWJF) standard practice for such initiatives is 
to establish what it refers to as a National Program Oﬃce (NPO), an intermediary2 that 
provides general oversight and guidance to the participating sites.  Foundation personnel 
cite a number of advantages of this approach:
• Efficiency — outsourcing program management allows the Foundation to avoid hiring 
large numbers of specialized staﬀ people who might not be well suited to work in other 
program areas following the end of the initiative.
• Talent recruitment — hiring NPO directors, usually half-time, means that the Foundation 
can attract the best and the brightest in the ﬁeld at the same time that these individuals 
can continue to work and stay current in their ﬁelds. 
• Credibility — associating the Foundation’s program with people who are well recognized 
in their ﬁelds can inspire belief in the value of the enterprise among various local and 
national audiences.
• Overhead cost reduction — grants to intermediaries are considered program rather than 
administrative expenses for tax purposes so the Foundation can keep its administrative 
overhead low.
1 Prudence Brown is a Research Fellow at the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago where her 
work focuses on learning from and strengthening philanthropic eﬀorts to build communities that support children 
and families. Before coming to Chapin Hall, she served as Deputy Director of the Urban Poverty Program at the Ford 
Foundation. She holds a PhD. in Social Work and Psychology from the University of Michigan.
2 The term “intermediary” is often applied to diﬀerent types of entities.  In this paper, intermediary refers to an entity 
hired by a foundation to oversee and provide assistance to multiple sites in a national initiative.  Another use of the 
term, which is not the focus of this paper, is to describe local entities that are placed between funding agencies and 
service delivery systems to disburse funds, provide training, monitor grants and other activities.
3Beyond these reasons for working through an intermediary, RWJ staﬀ recognized that the 
NPO for the Urban Health Initiative required some particular capacities that diﬀerentiated 
it from RWJF’s typical NPOs, which at that time were often headed by clinicians and other 
professionals associated with medical and nursing schools. More speciﬁcally, they knew that 
to be successful, UHI had to persuade political leaders that community resources would 
have to be used diﬀerently. Because politics and money were central to the Foundation’s 
conception of UHI, RWJ staﬀ felt the NPO needed a leader who had experience trying to 
change the way government and policy work at the local level on behalf of children.3 
Already known to the Foundation through some previous work, former Seattle Mayor 
Charles Royer ﬁt the bill very well.  Royer selected a Deputy Director, Cindy Curreri, who 
also had deep experience in local and state government.  Royer and Curreri constituted a 
leadership team that looked quite diﬀerent than the physicians leading other NPOs, but 
RWJF staﬀ was comfortable that it represented a good ﬁt with UHI’s needs.  Foundation staﬀ 
also recognized that UHI’s NPO was also going to be larger than most other Foundation 
NPOs because Royer and Curreri were going to provide leadership and hands-on site work 
that went far beyond the traditional role of brokering technical assistance and monitoring 
site expenditures.
Early Challenges
Although Royer was involved in the site selection process as a consultant, the NPO did 
not begin operations until January 1996 when eight sites received support for the two-year 
planning period at the end of which the ﬁnal group of ﬁve sites was awarded implementation 
grants. This planning period confronted the NPO with a mix of operational and strategic 
challenges.  Although they seem fairly predictable in retrospect, these challenges were largely 
a function of the fact that neither the Foundation, nor the NPO, nor the sites had ever set out 
to do an initiative of this kind before.   Some of these challenges were:
• The timing of its grant meant that the NPO had to open an oﬃce and staﬀ up at the same 
time that it was charged with providing technical assistance to the sites on demand.
• Only a subset of the sites would be selected to move forward into the implementation 
phase, which constrained the development of trust and open exchange between the sites 
and the NPO.  Sometimes the sites hesitated to ask for help because they worried about 
exposing their weaknesses, and sometimes the NPO hesitated to take the initiative to 
provide assistance because it worried about perceived favoritism among competing sites.
• The NPO had expected a more senior and experienced group of site directors but 
most lacked skills in key areas of strategic planning, communications, and navigating 
a constantly changing political environment. The NPO had also expected sites to more 
readily grasp UHI’s system change goals and the need to use data and information on 
best practices to develop their local plans.   The relative absence of good local data further 
slowed down the planning process.
Besides having implications for planning similar initiatives in the future, these and other 
challenges required the NPO to undertake much more intensive training and technical 
3 See other UHI Lessons Learned papers, particularly Reﬂections on the Start-Up of the Urban Health Initiative and The 
Origins of the Urban Health Initiative, both by Paul Jellinek, Urban Health Initiative, 2004.
4assistance than originally anticipated. Nonetheless, at the end of the two-year planning 
period, ﬁve sites were awarded four-year grants (with the expectation of a second four-year 
grant pending initial results), and the initiative oﬃcially entered implementation.
The NPO’s Role
As UHI’s intermediary, the NPO was charged with making the initiative happen, with 
translating the ideas behind UHI into action on the ground in ﬁve U.S. cities.  NPO 
leadership describes its role as twofold: “trying to ensure the success of the sites and telling 
the unvarnished truth to the Foundation.” To do this successfully, the NPO played a number 
of roles and assumed a range of functions over the life of the initiative. Its main activities 
included:
• Technical assistance to site directors and board members. The NPO provided direct 
one-on-one technical assistance to sites on all aspects of the initiative: hiring staﬀ, board 
development, budgeting and accounting, strategic planning, ﬁnding and using data 
and best practices, communications, negotiating local politics, leadership development, 
fundraising, and problem solving about a wide array of individual site challenges 
and opportunities. Although the intensity of contact varied depending on site need 
and the stage of the initiative, each site was assigned a NPO staﬀ person who made at 
least 5-6 site visits each year. These technical assistance visits were supplemented by 
regularly scheduled phone calls and more informal phone and email conversations 
as needed. The NPO provided considerable mentoring to site staﬀ and board members 
over UHI’s ten years.
• Convenings.  The NPO arranged a host of annual meetings, retreats and trainings at 
which participants could network with each other and share their lessons, learn about a 
particular topic, gain exposure to experts in the ﬁeld, and visit programs of interest. Some 
convenings, such as the Inner-City Leadership visits, involved up to 25 people from each 
site; others targeted smaller groups of board and staﬀ members and UHI Fellows. Some 
lasted several days and allowed for signiﬁcant cross-fertilization among participants; 
others involved one or two-day training sessions to impart speciﬁc knowledge and skills. 
• Connecting sites to resources.  NPO staﬀ helped connect sites with local and national 
resources ranging from prospective board members and government oﬃcials to program 
research and funding opportunities. 
• Running interference.  Sometimes the NPO was called upon by sites to run interference 
locally as when it helped one site  “get rid of some staﬀ members who were political hires,” 
another to “make sure our ﬁduciary sponsor did not spend our resources inappropriately,” 
and still another to “keep the city at a distance when it wanted our funds for certain 
services and to endorse certain ballot initiatives that were unrelated to our agenda.”  In 
these cases, the NPO represented the public face of the Foundation and used this authority 
to help solve a local problem.
• Program development.  The NPO had the ﬂexibility to develop special programs as 
needed over the life of the initiative. Its main contribution was the Fellows Program, 
which involved individuals in each city who could expand and deepen the site’s work by 
providing access to key policymakers, expertise in program or tactical areas, and/or help 
in implementing system-change strategies. 
5• Program monitoring.  The NPO set up systems of tracking and reporting outcome 
and process data; the sites used this system to submit Getting to Scale Reports4 to the 
NPO every six months. Near the end of the initiative, the NPO had an independent data 
expert check, ﬁrst, whether the data were correct and, second, whether the site played a 
meaningful role in securing the needed change. 
• Keeping the Foundation informed.  The NPO communicated with the Foundation 
through structured calls that initially took place weekly, then biweekly, and later monthly. 
Other forms of engagement included such venues as seeing Foundation staﬀ at meetings, 
inviting them to join the NPO on site visits, and ongoing email contact.
• Learning.  The Foundation’s standard practice for long-term, multi-site initiatives is to 
support an evaluation carried out by an independent contractor. To evaluate UHI, the 
Foundation selected a team at the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service 
at New York University.  The Foundation also supported the Urban Seminar Series at 
Harvard University, a forum that brought together leading researchers and practitioners 
with UHI participants to address the latest thinking on UHI-related issues.  The NPO 
consulted with the Harvard team to help design seminars that would provide maximum 
utility to the sites. Additionally, the NPO worked throughout the life of the initiative 
to draw out lessons for participants and the larger ﬁeld through discussion at cross-site 
meetings, reﬂections among its staﬀ, and the Lessons Learned series of occasional papers 
such as this one. 
Value of the NPO to UHI Sites
“A good intermediary knows how to do what it’s telling the sites to do—
that’s basic, you need to have people who have lived the experience.”
“They kept the vision alive and our eyes on the prize.”
“They opened up a world of excellence and expectation that set our work on 
a sound path.”
“The NPO has helped to build capacity. They have tried to do it with me—
advise me but not give me the answers.”
“NPO leadership is no nonsense but that’s good once you understand what 
they are trying to accomplish.” 
“The NPO’s patience is extraordinary—they know how hard to push and 
when to back oﬀ.”
4 Getting to Scale (GTS) reports are mechanisms created by the NPO to chart site process outcomes, including numbers 
of children reached with each programmatic strategy, dollars generated for or redirected to each strategy, and policy 
changes achieved.
6• Fiscal Management. Unlike some intermediaries, the NPO did not assume a substantial 
regranting role. The Foundation funded the sites directly but the NPO monitored the sites’ 
ﬁscal operations and negotiated all site budgets before submitting them to RWJF with its 
recommendations to fund, to withhold or to modify the site requests. With grants under 
$50,000, the understanding with RWJF was that the NPO’s decisions would be honored 
without lengthy Foundation staﬀ review so that the grants could be turned around rather 
quickly. Larger grants went through a more extensive internal Foundation process but 
the NPO’s recommendations constituted a key basis for decisions. In fact, in no case over 
UHI’s ten years have these recommendations been turned down by the Foundation.
The NPO had an annual budget of about $1.5 million to carry out the roles described above. 
Costs varied by UHI’s stage of development but broke down roughly into personnel (about 
50 percent), travel and meeting expenses, consultants, and the direct costs of running an 
oﬃce.  The staﬃng pattern varied over time depending on UHI’s needs but included the 
director, deputy director, communications director, and administrative staﬀ; staﬀ responsible 
for specialized functions such as research and leadership; systems specialists who worked 
with sites; and operations and cross-site meeting staﬀ. The budget also aﬀorded the NPO 
the ﬂexibility to support the costs of some program development, such as the staﬀ and 
meeting costs of the Fellows Program.  UHI’s NPO costs were greater than some other NPOs 
supported by the Foundation but the roles and functions the NPO played were consistent 
with these costs. 
Sites’ Feedback Regarding the NPO
Although each of the sites faced diﬀerent challenges and opportunities locally, they share the 
view that the NPO added inestimable value to their work. “If it hadn’t been for the NPO’s 
support, we would have gone belly up.” The NPO “made us be sharp and rich and pushed 
and prodded us, that’s what put us in a position to keep looking at data and be true to the 
idea of outcomes.” Among the functions that the NPO served that the sites most appreciated 
were the following:  
• Inspiration and focus. Sites felt that the NPO gave them an exciting new vision that was 
expressed in bold and inspiring terms. The NPO shared its deep concern for children 
with local staﬀ and board members and was able to generate a sense of purpose that was 
more ambitious than any agenda previously undertaken by the community. When sites 
strayed from the vision, the NPO was relentless in its refocusing eﬀorts. 
• Deep substantive expertise.  The sites viewed the NPO as a source of “very strategic and 
useful thinking” and of eﬀective, practical help.  The NPO’s ability to troubleshoot on a 
wide range of issues and its political and systems sensibility positioned it as an extremely 
helpful resource in navigating the complexities of local systems reform. The sites felt 
that the NPO understood and could help them address the problems they faced in part 
because NPO staﬀ had such deep and relevant experience in various public sector roles. 
• Exposure to new ways of thinking.  Over and over again, sites provided examples of 
ideas and experts to whom they were exposed by the NPO—new ways of thinking about 
a problem, new understanding of strategies being used around the country, new practice 
networks they could call upon. In many cases, site directors could trace the results of this 
exposure to new ways in which local oﬃcials were spending resources or new ways in 
which local provider networks were changing their operations. 
7• Flexible, capacity-building support.  Sites felt that the NPO understood the critical role 
of local context and the need to individualize solutions rather than impose standardized 
ones.  They felt respected by an NPO that did not claim credit or compete with them 
locally but, instead, seemed totally committed to helping them “look good” and meet 
their goals. The mentoring and leadership training provided personal and professional 
support highly valued by the sites. 
• Ability to surface and manage differences. Sites felt that they had the kind of 
relationship with the NPO in which they could disagree but then negotiate and reach 
an understanding. Having enough conﬁdence in the relationship to have dialogue about 
diﬀerences allowed the sites to avoid the time and stress of dishonest communications 
and strategizing about how to “get around” the NPO, a more common dynamic of funder-
grantee relationships. 
The sites also had some suggestions about what the NPO might have done more eﬀectively. 
These suggestions include:
• Greater guidance early on.  Sites would have appreciated more direction and guidance at 
the beginning (and note that this would have been easier if the NPO had been established 
before the planning period). They liked being able to select the local problems for focus, 
but more clarity about what they needed to do during the planning period and what 
staﬀ leadership was needed to do it—backed up by some written materials—would have 
been useful. It took some time before the NPO developed an eﬀective strategy—most 
importantly, the Denominator Exercise5—for helping sites gain a thorough understanding 
of UHI’s goals as a systems change initiative. Doing so earlier would have saved time and 
energy during this period and helped the sites understand UHI’s driving vision better and 
translate it into action sooner in UHI’s evolution. Setting interim measures of progress 
for each site early on in implementation would also have helped them maintain focus 
and mission. Some, but not all sites, would have liked more direction and structured 
assistance around various other aspects of the initiative such as the Fellows Program, 
communications, or strategies for sustainability.
• Stronger policy role.  Most of the sites felt that the NPO could have played a stronger 
policy role.  When sites worked with the NPO on a legislative brieﬁng or a meeting 
with mayoral staﬀ, for example, they quickly appreciated what a powerful force the 
NPO could be for them and they wanted more. Just the NPO’s presence (representing 
RWJF and speaking with the authority of a large national foundation) and the “force 
of its commitment seemed to make a powerful statement and allow us to walk through 
that open door.”  One director felt that legislators came to the site’s brieﬁng because of 
the RWJF name, which lent a diﬀerent kind of credibility than her board could deliver. 
In retrospect, she would have put more emphasis on state level work, as achieving big 
city scale requires state support and, therefore, an investment by the change agent in 
generating both local and state buy-in. A diﬀerent perspective came from a site that did 
not feel that an organization from outside the state could have suﬃcient clout either at the 
local or state level to be very helpful, while yet another site would have preferred the NPO 
to assume a more visible public advocacy role (within the bounds of nonproﬁt tax laws). 
5 The Denominator Exercise is described on page 11 of the UHI Lessons Leaned paper, Using Data in the Decision-
Making Process by Jerry VanderWood, Urban Health Initiative, 2003. 
8• More help telling the story.  Several sites would have liked the NPO to have started earlier 
to publish lessons learned pieces based on UHI’s evolving experience. They view this 
as a strategy for getting national attention, positioning the NPO to do more policy 
work nationally, and helping to shape peoples’ understanding of UHI along the way. 
In addition to the evaluation, the sites felt that multiple vehicles were needed in order 
to capture the richness and complexity of the UHI story, including both what UHI 
accomplished and how it did so.
• More connection to RWJF.  The sites understood that their primary relationship 
within UHI was with the NPO, not the Foundation.  But they all questioned whether 
the relationship with the NPO had to preclude a more direct connection to RWJF. 
As the initiative draws to a close and the NPO ceases to exist, the sites wonder how 
they can maintain some place on RWJF’s landscape. In the short run, they would 
like RWJF’s help accessing other big national foundations for possible support. But 
they also appreciate the possible long-term benefits of having an ongoing 
relationship with a foundation beyond that of grantee. Several also wondered whether 
RWJF could join with other funders to institutionalize an ongoing technical assistance 
and convening resource in their regions. 
Lessons from the NPO’s Experience in UHI
The NPO’s experience in UHI suggests some broader lessons for foundations and 
intermediaries engaged in long-term multi-site initiatives:
#1: “IF THE RELATIONSHIPS DON’T WORK, WE’RE DEAD IN THE WATER.” 
Trust and good communication are central to an intermediary’s ability to manage the inherent 
tension that surfaces in its relationships with an initiative’s sites and with its sponsors.  The 
intermediary has to “deliver the goods” to both parties but it has to do so with an astute 
blend of transparency, responsiveness and respect. It must constantly balance foundation 
and site needs and keep its eye on the overall success of the initiative: “we never pretend we 
are just there for the sites or just there for the Foundation.” 
Relationships take time. Each party needs to feel that the intermediary appreciates its 
particular context and demands.  The foundation can worry that the NPO might embarrass 
the foundation or put it at risk by being too much of an advocate or by speaking for the 
foundation inappropriately. The sites can see the intermediary as an agent of the foundation 
that has the power to withdraw their funding or dictate their agenda. As one site director 
noted, “They [NPO] were wise in terms of the amount of personal contact it would take to 
make such an ambitious enterprise work. Face-to-face time with people with whom you 
have some accountability is very useful.” Another site’s board member commented that to 
understand why the NPO required them to put so much time and eﬀort into the Denominator 
Exercise, “we had to learn about each other to get it, we had to get familiar.” Then the group 
could move from performing for the NPO (and in some cases concealing problems) to 
understanding that the NPO was “on the same team and highly invested in our success.”
Sites also understood that the NPO advocated for them with RWJF, but not indiscriminately. 
What made this work well was that sites knew that they could count on the NPO to say the 
same thing to the sites as to the foundation and that the sites could push back if they did not 
9fully agree with the NPO’s perspective or assessment. This transparency meant that UHI did 
not experience the common problem of sites “going around” the intermediary to make their 
case directly to the funder.
#2: “A GOOD INTERMEDIARY STICKS TO THE VISION AND TELLS  
THE SITES AND THE FOUNDATION WHAT THEY NEED TO HEAR, 
WHICH IS NOT NECESSARILY WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR.” 
Both the sites and the foundation underscore the value of an independent intermediary that 
speaks the truth.  The following comments from a site leader and foundation representative 
illustrate the point: 
 “Initially the NPO was very useful—they played the Judge Judy role—and said (more 
politely):  ‘What you are doing is useless.’ We couldn’t hear it at the beginning; some 
here said the NPO was too intrusive . . . But the lack of a willingness to listen among 
some of our group meant that there was no chance of achieving scale, we were 
unwilling to see that some of our plans were worthless or, even if worthwhile, unlikely 
to produce the results we wanted.  Real threat and confrontation was a signiﬁcant 
value of the NPO.  Basically they said, ‘get your act together or you will lose the 
money.’  The important thing was that it was not the same old message from people 
who needed to be liked.  If the sole purpose of these initiatives is to make people feel 
good about themselves, then you have lost it in the beginning . . . They forced us to get 
oﬀ the dime.”  (Site leader)
 “The NPO’s leadership knows when to be supportive and friendly but also when to 
draw the line . . . Sometimes it was important to have somebody who could play 
hardball, sometimes you get intermediaries that just want to go along with what sites 
are doing, look the other way, and pretend it’s all ﬁne. Everybody likes to be liked.”  
(Foundation representative)
Sites acknowledge that it was a balancing act for the NPO. Because an intermediary wants to 
gain the sites’ trust and to engage them in honest discussion, overusing the ultimatum would 
have a chilling eﬀect. “So the art of it is when and how much to push hard and respecting the 
boundaries around it.” 
Similarly, the foundation cannot make the NPO pay a price for candor.  Rewarding 
“honorable failure” and learning from bad news is easier said than done given pressures 
within a foundation, but is key to the initiative’s integrity and contribution to the larger 
ﬁeld.  One of the hardest jobs for an intermediary is keeping its focus on the initiative’s 
vision in spite of mission drift or inevitable pressures to reframe its goals in the face of 
adversity. One observer credited the NPO with seeing its role as “not to conﬁrm the success 
of the initiative but to actually try to promote change.” 
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#3: “WE ARE CHANGE AGENTS, NOT TECHNICIANS.” 
When a foundation decides to use an intermediary, it must determine the division of labor 
between the two organizations—who does what, and with what authority and responsibility. 
In UHI’s case, RWJF was not looking for simply a manager. Rather, the Foundation wanted 
an intermediary that would have signiﬁcant input into all of UHI’s major decisions and, 
as a result, it gave the NPO a good deal of discretionary authority. For example, the 
NPO decided when and how hard to push sites, when to back oﬀ if a site was going through 
board leadership change, how often to visit sites, when to use the Foundation’s name in 
a good cop/bad cop way, and so forth.  The Foundation was responsive to the NPO’s 
requests, as when asked, for example, to accompany the NPO on particular site visits, 
but it also deferred to the NPO’s judgment even when it might not fully understand or agree 
with all of its decisions.  For example, the NPO devoted what seemed to some RWJF staﬀ 
to be too much money for its cross-site meetings.  However, the NPO believed that it 
was important for site leadership to have an opportunity to get away to a nice place in 
order to both reduce stress and burnout and create a space in which productive cross-site 
exchange and learning would most likely ﬂourish.  The Foundation ultimately supported 
this decision and others because both parties understood where the prerogative lay.
In some cases, a foundation may only want or need an intermediary to play a much more 
limited managerial role. The critical issue here is to make sure there is clarity upfront about 
what functions the intermediary is to play and to align suﬃcient resources with these 
functions. The NPO in UHI had both the role clarity and resources it needed from RWJF to 
function eﬀectively. 
#4: “MANAGING CHANGE IS THE NAME OF THE GAME IN A COMPLEX, 
LONG-TERM INITIATIVE.” 
RWJF recognized that systems change is a long-term endeavor and thus designed UHI as 
a ten-year initiative.  While clearly appropriate, the extended nature of the initiative puts a 
premium on the NPO’s capacity to anticipate and adapt to change at all levels.
Change at the Foundation.  Over the course of UHI’s ten years, the NPO’s program 
oﬃcer changed several times, the Foundation’s leadership changed, and the three original 
champions for UHI, two of whom were in senior management, left the Foundation.  Such 
changes are inevitable over a decade, as they are at the sites, but each one required the NPO 
and the Foundation to invest signiﬁcant time and energy in building trust and new working 
relationships. Whether on the front line or in management, new staﬀ may not understand 
or feel totally committed to past agreements, and often bring new ideas and new ways of 
working to the table. Staﬀ who inherit grant programs are rarely as invested as the original 
designers and champions of these programs.  Finally, as a long-term initiative evolves, overall 
donor fatigue can set in accompanied by increased worries at the staﬀ and/or board level 
about the initiative’s costs, results and products. 
Change at the sites.  A decade has also brought signiﬁcant change to the political, economic 
and organizational landscape of UHI’s participating cities: new mayors and governors, 
diﬀerent (and generally reduced) funding streams, new federal legislation governing welfare 
11
and education, and so forth.6  Most sites have undergone considerable staﬀ and board turnover 
as the diﬀerent stages in UHI’s development called for diﬀerent strategies and capacities. 
And in the ﬁnal years when the RWJF funds account for a lower proportion of their overall 
budgets, some sites have their own version of initiative fatigue: other funders’ goals become 
priorities, and the temptation to revert to becoming service provider intermediaries rather 
than change agents is ever-present.  
The challenge for the NPO was to adapt its strategies and respond ﬂexibly to changing 
conditions while keeping UHI’s vision and goals at the forefront of both the Foundation and 
the sites’ consciousness.  Although it sometimes felt like the “maiden aunt in the basement,” 
the NPO kept information ﬂowing into the Foundation. And as sites confronted various 
obstacles and diversions, NPO staﬀ was relentless about UHI’s key focus on scale and the 
site’s change agent role. It also found that it was useful to review the history of the initiative 
and its core ideas and values each time the sites and foundation met because the players 
changed regularly over time. 
The NPO found that to manage change it needed to keep reinventing itself over the ten-year 
period.  The changing nature of the support needed by sites required the NPO to shift its own 
staﬃng lines over time. In the early years, for example, the NPO had some dedicated staﬀ 
focused on best practice research; this shifted over time to the need for staﬀ who could help 
sites with development. Similarly, the NPO sponsored more convenings and did more direct 
leadership training in the ﬁrst half of the initiative but reduced staﬀ for these functions as the 
sites needed less support in this area.  
The NPO’s ﬂexibility and ability to adapt to change while being steadfast in its commitment 
to UHI’s core goals touches on a few operational issues:
• The NPO found that hiring staﬀ, as opposed to brokering consultants, provided a much 
more eﬀective way to provide assistance and training to sites. It was hard to get part-time 
consultants to internalize the driving ideas behind UHI, be consistent in their application 
of these ideas, and be available to sites in a timely way.  While adding staﬀ made the NPO 
larger than most other RWJF NPOs, it made sense for an initiative as complex as UHI. 
• Foundations and intermediaries managing multi-site initiatives face an inherent tension 
between treating sites uniformly as a cohort and matching the size and timing of each 
site’s grants to its performance and needs. In UHI, the NPO came to the view that 
individualizing the pace and the amount of grant funding each site received from the 
Foundation and that building this ﬂexibility into an initiative’s design at the outset had 
many advantages. 
• The budget ﬂexibility provided by the Foundation enabled the NPO to use its resources 
in a responsive fashion. When a program was not working as well as it would have liked, 
such as its Youth Leadership Program, it could redirect the resources to other functions. 
A University, however, may not always be the best home for an intermediary that 
wants to stay nimble and have the freedom to set its own guidelines for staﬀ and 
consultant compensation. 
6 See UHI Lessons Learned paper, Political Strategizing in a Constantly Changing Environment, by Jerry VanderWood, 
Urban Health Initiative, 2004.
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#6: “ONGOING DIALOGUE AMONG THE EVALUATORS, THE INTERMEDIARY 
AND THE FOUNDATION WOULD PROMOTE LEARNING.”
As mentioned earlier, RWJF’s standard practice for long-term, multi-site initiatives is to 
support an evaluation carried out by an independent contractor. Part of the thinking is that an 
intermediary, particularly one managing a long-term initiative, is vulnerable to “going native,” 
that is getting so invested in the sites’ success that it fails to see weaknesses or exaggerates 
their accomplishments.  So RWJF selects an outside evaluator to study the initiative’s impact, 
while the NPO assesses sites’ ongoing progress and promotes cross-site learning through 
meetings, written materials such as this Lessons Learned series, and other vehicles.
This arrangement poses two questions that have challenged UHI to date. First, how can 
the evaluators and the intermediary learn from each other as they carry out their diﬀerent 
knowledge development functions? The risks of creating too impermeable a “ﬁrewall” 
between evaluators and implementers in complex, community change initiatives have been 
well documented.  But few methodologies exist for connecting the two in a way that is 
mutually beneﬁcial.  It is not surprising that the evaluators, the intermediary, and the sites 
prioritize diﬀerent research questions and sources of data and may end up with somewhat 
diﬀerent views of the lessons from a complex initiative that unfolds over a long time period. 
Indeed, the exchange of ideas based in these diﬀerent perspectives can be a powerful and 
useful learning exercise for the ﬁeld. What needs more development, however, are the 
vehicles for structuring that kind of productive exchange on a regular basis over the life of 
a long-term enterprise like UHI. Periodic formal ‘checkpoints’ among the foundation, the 
intermediary, the sites and the evaluators could be one useful strategy to help maintain a 
shared understanding of the initiative and its deﬁnitions for success, while each entity lives 
out its independent role. 
The second question is one that exists whenever a foundation “outsources” initiative 
management and learning to an intermediary: how can the foundation draw upon all the 
ways that the initiative is generating knowledge and make the learning accessible to its own 
staﬀ and board as well as to the larger ﬁeld?  Foundation staﬀ who are not involved in day-
to-day initiative management and who, in fact, are responsible for many initiatives have little 
time, incentive or support for focusing on learning. But all agree that the learning cannot 
reside in the sites and NPO alone and acknowledge the importance of ﬁnding new ways to 
value and incorporate learning into their work. 
These two challenges are not unique to UHI but are drawing the attention of staﬀ at RWJF 
as well as other foundations concerned with maximizing learning from their initiatives 
to inform their work in the future and build knowledge more broadly. Developing some 
strategies for testing new approaches to these challenges and building in from an initiative’s 
outset periodic opportunities for dialogue among the diﬀerent parties may constitute a 
beginning step toward this goal. 
13
Summary Points
In UHI, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation took on an ambitious agenda based on 
ideas that had yet to be tested in the philanthropic arena. The NPO played a central role in 
translating that agenda into a reality and, in the process, generated some general observations 
about the use of an intermediary in a complex, long-term initiative. 
1. Some of the advantages of a foundation’s choice to work with an intermediary include 
eﬃciency, talent recruitment, credibility and reduction of overhead costs.
2. Having decided to use an intermediary, a foundation must think through exactly how 
to structure the relationship in light of both the initiative’s goals and the foundation’s 
operating principles, capacities and culture. 
3. A successful foundation-intermediary relationship requires clarity regarding expectations 
and rules of engagement, eﬀective communication, ﬂexibility and trust. Appendix A 
includes a list of questions that the foundation and the intermediary can address together 
in order to establish a strong basis for launching the enterprise. The agreements that come 
out of this discussion represent institutional commitments that should guide the initiative 
thereafter, regardless of changing personnel at the foundation or intermediary. 
4. A key function of an intermediary is to hold up the initiative’s vision and tell the truth to 
both the sites and the foundation despite pressures to drift, accommodate or relay only 
good news.
5. Deep experience and expertise in the areas in which it is providing technical assistance 
help position the intermediary to be respected by and useful to the sites.
6. An initiative’s evaluation and other learning activities need to be intentionally structured 
to inform each other and maximize learning for each key audience: the sites, the 
intermediary, the foundation and the ﬁeld. 
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Appendix A
Questions for Foundations and Intermediaries to Address at the Outset of an Initiative7
• Does the intermediary fully understand the foundation’s vision and goals for the initiative?
• How will we divide the tasks—who does what, who is accountable to whom for what? 
How will authority and responsibility be allocated?
• Who has responsibility for/control over which kinds of funds? How ﬂexible are these 
funds?
• How will we communicate—how frequently, in what ways, about what?
• How will diﬀerences be resolved?
• What are the foundation’s sensitivities and risk tolerance?
• What importance does the foundation attribute to candid reports on problems and 
progress, and what are the likely consequences of hearing various forms of “bad news”?
• What kinds of grantee problems need not be disclosed to the foundation?
• What degree of contact does the foundation expect to maintain with grantees?
• How can the foundation and the intermediary be learning partners?  How will the 
foundation and intermediary relate to the evaluation?
• What degree of oversight should the intermediary expect from foundation staﬀ?
• What degree of contact should the intermediary expect to have with the foundation’s 
board?
• By whom and against what standards will the intermediary’s work be evaluated?
• What expectations exist regarding the intermediary after the initiative is formally over? 
• How can the understanding and commitments we establish at the outset persist over the 
life of the initiative while being reviewed on a periodic basis and modiﬁed as necessary? 
7 Some of these questions are included in or adapted from the Funder’s Checklist in P. L. Szanton,  “Toward More 
Eﬀective Use of Intermediaries,” in Practice Matters: The Improving Philanthropy Project, September 2003 (www.
fdncenter.org/for_grantmakers/practice_matters/), p. 43.
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